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Introduction 
What if we approached Kierkegaard’s philosophy with the classic metaphysical theme of “the One 
and the Many” in mind? Doing so, I contend, can help us see how Kierkegaard embraces a form 
of diversity that runs even deeper than the “deep diversity” of which Charles Taylor has written.1 
This is because Kierkegaard’s diversity is able to admit values that are not only irreducible but 
also, at times, incompatible. More than this, he sees their incompatibility as paradoxical, and in a 
way which supports a creativity that, I shall argue, is able to respond constructively to some of our 
most intractable ethical dilemmas.   
As I conceive of “the One and the Many,” it is chiefly concerned with the degree of connection 
between beings: Are they cohesive and so, together, exhibit a oneness, thereby constituting a unity, 
or are they disconnected and fragmented, thereby constituting a plurality? Or are they, somehow, 
both? Kierkegaard is drawn to this latter possibility, since it is the one that embodies the kind of 
paradox he would have us place at the centre of our lives. Even though he himself sometimes fails 
to live up to this ideal, its power should be evident, as I will show by concluding with a brief 
examination of perhaps the most difficult issue in contemporary just war theory. The question is 
as follows: Must we continue to fight justly even when confronted by what Michael Walzer has 
called a “supreme emergency,” that is, when we believe our community faces an imminent threat 
to its most fundamental values, indeed to its very existence?  
 
 
                                               
*A chapter from Towards One, as Many (forthcoming); also published in Mélissa Fox-Muraton, ed., Kierkegaard and 
Issues in Contemporary Ethics (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2020). 
1 Taylor introduced the idea of deep diversity in support of his argument for how the different national communities 
within Canada – those of the English-speaking Canadians, French-speaking Quebeckers, and Aboriginals – conceive 
of their belonging to the country in different ways: “Shared and Divergent Values,” in Reconciling the Solitudes: 
Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism, ed. Guy Laforest (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1993), p. 183. See also my “On Charles Taylor’s ‘Deep Diversity’,” in Ursula Lehmkuhl and 
Elisabeth Tutschek, eds., 150 Years of Canada: Grappling with Diversity since 1867 (Münster, Germany: Waxmann 
Verlag GmbH, 2020). 
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I. Kierkegaard’s “Pluramonism” 
According to Kierkegaard, the kind of reflection characteristic of disengaged spectators has led us 
to a passionless age of nihilistic levelling, one in which all qualitative distinctions have been 
undermined. Not that this nihilism is ontological; when it comes to ontology, it is pluralist rather 
than nihilist, since it is the product of a “negatively unifying principle.” It can be considered 
ethically nihilistic, though, because of its relativism. Kierkegaard recognizes that his 
contemporaries affirm many different kinds of values, but since the structures necessary for 
ranking them have been eroded, nothing really matters. And so nothing really happens. True, 
individuals occasionally exhibit momentary enthusiasms – but sooner or later these all fade, 
followed by a return to indolence.2 
So it is that, in order to avoid the despair induced by this ranking-free pluralism, people 
sometimes try to unify their values by making a total commitment to a single sphere of existence. 
“Purity of heart,” writes Kierkegaard somewhat ironically, “is to will one thing.”3  
The first sphere, which he calls “the aesthetic,” is where all who look to enjoy themselves are 
to be found. Yet those who live the aesthetic life to its fullest will eventually discover that it breaks 
down, throwing them back into pluralism and despair – that is, until they avoid this reality by 
leaping into the next sphere, “the ethical.” This is where people do good by fulfilling their social 
roles. However, the ethical, too, ultimately breaks down, requiring a leap into “the religious.” Its 
first form, “Religiousness A,” embraces both the natural spirituality of ancient Greek paganism 
and the ersatz Christianity exemplified by Hegelian dialectics. But Religiousness A’s monism fails 
to be true to all of reality, which is why Kierkegaard awards it “second place”4 alongside, and in 
tension with, the plural fragments remaining from the aesthetic and ethical spheres. So it is the 
combination of the unity of the former with the plurality of the latter that produces the paradox of 
“Religiousness B,” which for Kierkegaard is genuine Christianity. Only by embracing it can we 
achieve the openness to revelation that makes way for God’s saving grace. Whether or not 
                                               
2 See Kierkegaard, “The Present Age,” in Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age, A Literary 
Review, eds. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), esp. p. 81 for 
“negatively unifying principle.” 
3 Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, eds. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), part I. 
4 See Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs, ed. and trans. Alasdair 
Hannay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 465–66, 468. 
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Kierkegaard is right about this – and as we’ll see, he’s not – we should describe the paradox it 
involves as “pluramonist.” Because instead of unifying one and many into some new version of 
the one, it upholds both, separately and together. 
Kierkegaard’s terminology for supporting these conclusions seems likewise pluramonist. The 
very idea of “existence-spheres”5 is pluralist, whether we conceive of them as a plurality of unities, 
each capable of being metaphorically bounded by a spherical surface, or a plurality of fragments. 
Either way, there is absolutely Nothing situated between them. This is why they cannot be ranked. 
It is also why the leaps into each of them are necessarily irrational, because discontinuous. Yet 
Kierkegaard also describes the movement between spheres as a progression between “stages,” 
implying a linear, unified sequence.  
Not that this unification is straightforward. True, the aesthetic and ethical spheres (secular, 
because finite) are associated with the letters A and B, respectively, since this is how the writers 
defending each existential orientation are identified.6 But they are followed by the second pair of 
religious (because infinite7) spheres, variations also designated A and B.8 Why didn’t Kierkegaard 
choose to label the first sphere of this second pair C, and the one following it D? It seems to me 
that it’s because he wants us to see that something has gone wrong with the overall sequence, and 
that we should avoid assuming the latter pair successfully unifies all that has come before them. 
For their being A2 and B2 implies that they incite perhaps-never-fully-successful struggles to be 
true to themselves, as well as to the values retained from the previous spheres. 
Here is a formula that encapsulates all of this: spheres (pluralism) + stages (monism) = 
pluramonist supersessionism. Needless to say, we should avoid equating it with the monist 
supersessionism that is Hegelian dialectics. The latter advances by virtue of sublimations 
(Aufhebungen), which are supposed to both cancel the worthless and maintain the valuable aspects 
                                               
5 Kierkegaard, Stages on Life’s Way, eds. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988), p. 476. 
6 See Kierkegaard, Either/Or: Part I, p. 7. 
7 See Kierkegaard, Either/Or: Part II, pp. 345, 348, 350, 352. In the last section, “Ultimatum,” we are informed 
that religious life consists of answering “the call of the infinite.” And in Stages on Life’s Way, p. 443, we read that 
“faith is expressly the infinite.”  
8 See Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 465ff. Before this, the spheres were not clearly distinguished, though 
the sermon at the end of Either/Or about why we are always in the wrong in relation to God can be interpreted as 
contrasting the wrongness as guilt that has its place in Religiousness A with the wrongness as sin that has its place in 
of Religiousness B. On the latter, see also Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 225. 
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of the conflicting elements, while the former seems to both progress and regress simultaneously. 
Think of Judge William, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous ethicist, whose prolix claims to have fully 
incorporated all that is genuine about the aesthetic into his version of the ethical take on a “he doth 
protest too much” quality. After all, his ethics are so dour that it’s hard to see how they have room 
for much enjoyment; clearly, something valuable has been lost along the way. The judge’s claims 
to embrace Hegelian dialectics while being a genuine Christian also ring hollow.9 
Many commentators have missed much of the above picture. For example, it is incompatible 
with Johannes Corrodi Katzenstein’s typical claim that “each kind of life-view – aesthetic, ethical, 
or religious – embodies some ‘highest’ good(s) valued for the sake of itself.”10 Because the values 
of the aesthetic are, I would say, not quite “goods,” reserving the term for ethics (alas, that ship 
sailed long ago). And while the aesthetic is indeed valued for its own sake, that is not the case with 
the ethical; as I’ll suggest below, valuing goods for their own sake makes them aesthetic rather 
than ethical. Finally, at least when the religious sphere takes the form of what Kierkegaard sees as 
genuine Christianity, it too cannot simply be upheld for its own sake. For there’s also, it should go 
without saying, God’s sake. 
Or consider Hubert L. Dreyfus, who begins by recognizing how Kierkegaard associates 
despair with pluralism, how fragmentation can become so threatening that one feels confronted by 
“the impossible task of getting his or her self together.”11 Yet Dreyfus goes on to misconstrue 
Kierkegaard’s Christianity as a means of unifying the self, and so as a way of exchanging the 
despair of this pluralism for the bliss of monism. Here’s how. When Kierkegaard stipulates that “a 
synthesis is a relation between two,” he is referring to the pairs of opposing factors or terms that 
make up a human being who is nevertheless “still not a self.” To explain: 
 
In the relation between two, the relation is the third as a negative unity, and the two 
relate to the relation and in the relation to the relation; thus under the qualification of 
the psychical the relation between the psychical and the physical is a relation. If, 
                                               
9 See, for example, Either/Or: Part II, pp. 264, 10.  
10 Katzenstein, God and Passion in Kierkegaard’s Climacus (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), p. 98.  
11 Dreyfus, “Christianity without Onto-Theology: Kierkegaard’s Account of the Self’s Movement from Despair to 
Bliss,” in Background Practices: Essays on the Understanding of Being, ed. Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), p. 237. 
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however, the relation relates itself to itself, this relation is the positive third, and this 
is the self.12 
 
Cryptic as this passage is, it should nevertheless be evident that the “third” the relation represents 
can be either a “negative unity” (an expression referring not to the unity of Hegelian dialectics, as 
many interpreters assert, but, again, to disunity as plurality) or a “positive third” (that is, a unity) 
when relating itself to itself. So it is only when the two are present together that we get that 
paradoxical entity “the human self,”13 which is paradoxical precisely because it contains both the 
negative and the positive, both the plural and the unified. 
Dreyfus, however, interprets negative and positive as two ways in which the relation can relate 
to itself, and so be a self. He takes the negative to be one-sided and the positive two-sided although 
impossible14 – unless, that is, the individual makes an unconditional, defining commitment which 
exhibits infinite passion for something finite. Dreyfus is correct that, for Kierkegaard, making such 
a commitment effectively means accepting the paradox of Jesus Christ as one’s saviour, since only 
Jesus is both infinite and finite, God and a man.15 But Dreyfus misses how this paradox is also 
reflected in the human self’s pluramonist structure, since he conceives of the self as unifiable. He 
takes each of its factors to be ideally “defined in such a way as to support rather than be in conflict 
with the others”; they are to “reinforce each other” synergistically, “so that the more you manifest 
one the more you manifest the other.”16  
For Kierkegaard, however, they ought to do both this and its opposite. That is why his 
Christianity is not merely “not easy,” it is “extremely hard, the hardest task of all.”17 True, genuine 
Christians are “always joyful,” but they are far from experiencing pure bliss, since they know that 
they are “always in danger.”18 Otherwise, their religion would constitute no more than another 
ostensibly unified sphere of existence, which is to say Religiousness A rather than B. And that 
                                               
12 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening, 
eds. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 13.  
13 Ibid. 
14 See Dreyfus, pp. 237. 
15 See ibid., p. 239; and e.g. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 177, 182–83. 
16 Dreyfus, pp. 240, 245, 241. 
17 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 108. 
18 See Stages on Life’s Way, p. 470. 
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would lead to a failure to see that “it is up to us human beings to be careful not to become all too 
positive, for this would really mean being fooled by life.”19 
 
II. Deeper into Kierkegaard’s Spheres/Stages of Existence 
Let’s explore Kierkegaard’s spheres/stages of existence in more detail. The first, once again, 
reflects the aesthete’s commitment to enjoyment. I also suggested that this sphere is a unity and, 
at least temporarily, it is: like the ancient Greek idea of the cosmos, it is “wonderful at uniting 
what belongs together.”20 Indeed, sensuality follows a principle that manifests itself “as wanting 
to unite the separated,” the desire and the object desired, something that is said to take place in “an 
instant of enjoyment.”21 So while aestheticians aim to determine how, say, an opera “works” by 
taking it apart, true aesthetes approach it instead as a unified totality. They aim “not to discuss the 
individual parts separately but as far as possible to incorporate them into the whole, to see them 
not as detached from the whole but integrated in it . . . . [For] the unity in an opera is preserved by 
the dominant tone that sustains the whole.”22 In fact, all classic artistic works are seen as 
harmonious unities that exhibit a “mutual intimacy” of idea and form23 – just as the aesthete argues 
life does, when it is lived as a game is played, unifying theory and practice.24 This, then, is how 
the aesthete fulfils the strictly aesthetic values present within this sphere.25 When it comes to ethics, 
however, he admits to finding it boring.26 And while it is true that he occasionally appears to be 
open to religious values, one would be forgiven for questioning his piety.27 
                                               
19 Ibid., p. 444. John D. Glen, Jr. also misses how Kierkegaard would have us strive to uphold the tension between 
unity and plurality rather than aim for the former over the latter: “Kierkegaard is asserting that human selfhood 
involves certain inherent tensions – in this case, a tension between the self’s capacity for unity through time and the 
tendency of its existence to be dispersed into different moments. In this respect, the self’s task is to give its existence 
a unifying meaning…” Glen, Jr., “The Definition of the Self and the Structure of Kierkegaard’s Work,” in Robert L. 
Perkins, ed., International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 19: The Sickness unto Death (Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 2003, rev. ed.), p. 9. 
20 Either/Or: Part I, p. 47; see also p. 48. 
21 Ibid., p. 80.  
22 Ibid., pp. 116–17. 
23 See ibid., pp. 48–9, 54. 
24 See ibid., pp. 47, 58, 61, 432. 
25 See Either/Or: Part II, pp. 271–72. 
26 See Either/Or: Part I, p. 367. 
27 See e.g. Either/Or: Part I, pp. 20, 146. Note, however, that the aesthete doesn’t claim to believe in the Christian 
God (p. 61), not to mention follow austere forms of religion such as Presbyterianism (p. 72). 
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As many have noted, we can simplify the five aesthetic stages identified by Kierkegaard by 
noting how, when he writes in the guise of an ethicist, he identifies two basic kinds of aesthete: 
the unreflective and the reflective.28 The former is natural,29 in that he savours beautiful, sensuous 
experiences – albeit in a way that has only been possible since the rise of Christianity, which the 
natural aesthete nevertheless opposes (despite pursuing pleasures far less psychical than those of 
the ancient Greeks).30 Kierkegaard treats music as most conducive to this savouring since, unlike 
prose language, it is repetitive rather than unfolding and so strikes the ear as both immediate and 
abstract, which happens to be the central qualities of the Romantic symbol.31 This symbol is also 
an organic unity, of which Mozart’s opera Don Giovanni is perhaps the greatest embodiment.32 Its 
leading character is a perfect sensualist, as is evident from both his musicality and the fact that he 
is a deceiver but not a seducer. (As we’ll see, because seducers toy with people they should be 
classed among the more sophisticated, and so reflective, aesthetes.33)  
The unreflective aesthete is also an isolated individual, someone who lives apart from social 
institutions such as the family and state.34 Note that this “apartness” is a mereological quality. 
Despite being socially unintegrated (and so not a part of society holistically), the unreflective 
aesthete is still said to resemble an atom that has been collected alongside others within it; in both 
cases, then, society remains a unity.35 So we can understand the unreflective aesthete’s choice to 
join such strange associations as The Fellowship of the Dead, which shuns pluralism: “one must 
always guard against contracting a life relationship by which one can become many . . . . If an 
individual is many, he has lost his freedom.”36  
                                               
28 See Either/Or: Part II, pp. 181ff. As John Stuart Mill pointed out, there is “no known Epicurean theory of life 
which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments a 
much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.” Utilitarianism (1861), in Utilitarianism and the 1868 
Speech on Capital Punishment, ed. George Sher (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001, 2nd ed.), p. 
8.   
29 See Either/Or: Part II, pp. 132, 135. 
30 See Either/Or: Part I, pp. 61–62, 67, 72, 93–95; and Either/Or: Part II, pp. 181–82. 
31 See Either/Or: Part I, pp. 68–71, 95, 120. 
32 See ibid., pp. 85, 112, 118–120, 134. 
33 See ibid., pp. 98–102, 372. 
34 See ibid., pp. 149, 220. 
35 See ibid., pp. 151–152, 165–215; and Either/Or: Part II, p. 273. 
36 Either/Or: Part I, p. 297. 
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Indeed, aesthetes of this sort are what Isaiah Berlin would quickly identify as monist 
“hedgehogs,” since they manage to “acquire in the course of time a single phrase or a single idea 
with which they are able to signify everything to themselves and to the individual they have 
initiated into it.”37 It is also worth noting that while the Fellowship’s members desire sorrow, each 
aspiring to the title of “The Unhappiest One,”38 this is not because they shun enjoyment; on the 
contrary, they take delight in their sorrow as a diversion, a way of going outside of themselves.39 
Evidently, theirs is an aestheticized sorrow, a simulacrum of the real thing. While indulging in it 
would be considered a “sin” to the ethicist, they can be said to concur instead with Nietzsche that 
only the very best of us are capable of embracing the “joy” of tragedy.40 
Sooner or later, however, the threat of boredom induces aesthetes to turn to an increasingly 
sophisticated, reflective aesthetics, and so away from savouring and towards fantasizing and 
playing.41 To be sure, the reflective aesthete still appreciates beauty and immediacy.42 Yet he is 
also someone who has decided to live “poetically,” according to his imagination, which is why 
“his diary is not historically accurate.”43 By describing his experiences with great “dramatic 
vividness,” he hopes to be carried away into a “dreamland,” a “kingdom of mist” where he can 
fulfil his erotic fantasies.44 So as a seducer, his prime target is a young woman who also “lives in 
a world of fantasy”;45 moreover, he chases her as if he were a player in a game or sport.46 He plays 
to play and to not win, however, which is why he hopes to conquer but to not possess her.47 He 
                                               
37 Ibid., p. 200; and see Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History, ed. Henry 
Hardy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, 2nd ed.). 
38 See Either/Or: Part I, pp. 217–30. 
39 See ibid., pp. 175–76, 222; and Either/Or: Part II, pp. 233–36. 
40 Either/Or: Part II, p. 189; Nietzsche, “What I Owe to the Ancients,” in Twilight of the Idols, or How to 
Philosophize with a Hammer (1889), § 5, in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, 
eds. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
41 See Either/Or: Part I, pp. 37, 281–300, 328. 
42 See e.g. ibid., pp. 321–24, 381, 390, 428. 
43 Ibid., p. 304. See also ibid., pp. 391, 395; and Either/Or: Part II, p. 44. 
44 Either/Or: Part I, pp. 305, 310. See also p. 306; and Either/Or: Part II, p. 35. 
45 Either/Or: Part I, p. 341. See also Either/Or: Part II, p. 105. 
46 See Either/Or: Part I, pp. 307–308, 319, 322, 329, 360–61, 366, 384–85, 391, 423, 436; and Either/Or: Part II, 
pp. 78, 103–104, 107, 112. 
47 See Either/Or: Part II, pp. 130–31. 
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also differs from the unreflective aesthete in that he explicitly desires “joy” instead of sadness. 
That said, while certainly not anti-social, he too has no genuine friends.48  
Notice that while Kierkegaard’s aesthetes savour, play games for fun, and fantasize, they 
rarely if ever put on shows – that is, engage in spectacle – making this a major aesthetic mode that 
Kierkegaard appears to overlook.49 There are implications here for both his conception of ethics 
and his writing practice, as we’ll see below. At this point, I’ll simply mention again how he 
portrays the aesthetic sphere as a finite unity, a collection of immediate moments that, sooner or 
later, breaks up. This leads to a transition period marked by irony, which is then followed by the 
leap into the next sphere, that of the ethical. 
Where the aesthete is committed to the outer, the ethicist is to the inner; and where the aesthete 
affirms a “self-contained,” non-dialectical unity that requires choosing “only one thing,” the 
ethicist is dialectical.50 Above all, the ethicist is committed to playing, not games, but the social 
roles he has chosen, such as dutiful husband (“an ideal husband is not one who is ideal once in his 
life but one who is that every day”) and father (“I am playing a noble father”).51 The choice must 
be an either-or, all-or-nothing one – a choice, that is, over an “absolute contradiction.” And when 
the duties accompanying the chosen role are willingly performed, they will by no means limit the 
chooser’s freedom.52 Moreover, at least according to the ethicist, his way of life incorporates not 
only aesthetic but also (Christian) religious concerns. 
This differs from the strictly aesthetic life in a number of ways. In radically choosing his role, 
for instance, the ethicist avoids the aesthete’s deliberation over a plurality of choices.53 And since 
it is self-consciously a role rather than a game that he plays, he supposedly enjoys more than the 
“formal, abstract freedom”54 that comes from subjecting oneself to a systematically unified 
rulebook. The ethicist is also a husband who aims to possess his wife, rather than merely 
                                               
48 See Either/Or: Part I, pp. 428, 371. 
49 On pp. 24–25 of Either/Or: Part II, the ethicist makes this complaint of the aesthete: “you never give of yourself, 
never let others enjoy you.” However, on p. 185, one of the stages of aesthetic life is said to be “often found in young 
people, who . . . are easily tempted to exalt themselves, especially when they have an audience.” 
50 Either/Or: Part I, pp. 39, 43. That this approach is non-dialectical can be gleaned from the assertion, on p. 38, 
that “Tautology is and remains the highest principle, the highest maxim of thought.”  
51 Either/Or: Part II, pp. 135, 46. See also pp. 82, 280–83, 288, 298. 
52 Ibid., p. 223. See also pp. 43, 45, 146–53, 176, 214, 221. 
53 See ibid., pp. 164–69, 171, 173, 176–77, 211, 213–14, 219. 
54 Ibid., p. 178. 
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conquering her like a seducer.55 He likewise favours ongoing historical love over Romantic first 
love;56 poetry, given its ability to portray the meaning of time, over the supposed spatializing of 
music;57 actuality over the imaginary;58 and sociality over alienated aloneness.59 Unlike the easily 
bored aesthete, the ethicist also appears to embrace tedium – at least if his long-winded writing is 
any indication. And because the ethicist can be expected to give beauty its proper place,60 
integrating a “dethroned” aesthetics within the ethical,61 he avoids the aesthete’s tendency to live 
for the moment and pursue every mood or idea as an abstraction.62 Thus does he manage to shun 
the childishness so characteristic of those ancient aesthetes, the Greeks, who were governed by 
arbitrariness and did anything but welcome growing old.63 And where the aesthete is in denial 
about his pluralism (and so, ultimately, his nihilism, since his life eventually “disintegrates into 
nothing”64), the ethicist supposedly lives in unity.65 Indeed, it is none other than the ethicist’s 
“unity in a life-view” that allows him to meet “the condition for friendship” with other people.66 
As for the contrast between the ethicist’s life and that of the strictly religious, the upholder of 
“religious abstraction,”67 the ethicist still considers himself able to be a good Christian, since 
Christianity and ethics, God and the good, form a “complete whole.”68 For the ethical not only 
subsumes the aesthetic, but both may be considered “united” with religion69 – for this reason, the 
all-encompassing ethical can be seen as reflecting a self-contained “rational order,” one that “has 
                                               
55 See ibid., p. 131. 
56 See ibid., pp. 47, 138–44. 
57 See ibid., pp. 136–37. 
58 See ibid., p. 123. 
59 See ibid., pp. 83–84, 262, 273. 
60 See ibid., pp. 20–21, 57, 275–77, 323. 
61 Ibid., p. 226. See also ibid., pp. 177, 271.  
62 See ibid., pp. 17, 179, 229–30. 
63 See ibid., pp. 87, 121, 162, 186, 188, 257–58; and Fear and Trembling, in Fear and Trembling and Repetition, 
eds. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 9, 55. 
64 Either/Or: Part II, p. 11; see also pp. 50, 88, 90, 160, 168–69,192, 228. 
65 See ibid., pp. 219, 228. 
66 See ibid., pp. 319, 321. 
67 Stages on Life’s Way, p. 172. 
68 Either/Or: Part II, p. 21. See also ibid., pp. 22, 26, 32, 58, 61, 94; and Stages on Life’s Way, pp. 162, 178. 
69 Either/Or: Part II, pp. 34. See also ibid., pp. 116, 147. 
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its teleology in itself.”70 This monism is also behind the ethicist’s belief that marriage is an 
institution whose “sensuous love has but one transfiguration, in which it is equally aesthetic, 
religious, and ethical”71 and which thereby incarnates an “earthly love” that “ends with loving 
one.”72 And because those who marry constitute “a unity of contrasts,”73 their duties are unified 
rather than plural.74 No wonder family life can be said to exhibit a “coherence.”75  
Kierkegaard is clearly sceptical about the incorporation of genuine Christianity into the 
ethical, however. It says a great deal that the latter is presented as sensuous,76 as dismissing the 
notion of being born again,77 and as capable of being captured theoretically, that is, by a theology 
or “total view.”78 In any case, and more generally, Kierkegaard believes that the ethicist’s unity 
will also eventually break down. Before showing how, however, I want to register the 
disagreement that I have with him over the natures of both the aesthetic and the ethical. 
Essentially, I consider unified existence a gateway to the aesthetic. Ethical seriousness, by 
contrast, comes from contending with disunity, which is why genuinely unified worlds – paradises 
– are literally fantastic, so much so that we sometimes call them utopias (“no places”). To conceive 
of the ethical as “a perfect, self-contained sphere,”79 then, is to conceive of it as aesthetic rather 
than ethical. After all, whenever someone plays a role within a unity, it must itself be unified, and 
so they must ultimately be doing what they do for its own sake (given that its sake is contained 
within it). No surprise, then, that their actions tend to be for show, concerned with the impression 
they give to spectators. As it happens, this is precisely how the sociologist Erving Goffman has 
urged us to approach the performance of social roles: he argues that we should view such actions 
                                               
70 Ibid., pp. 292, 263. Living the ethical life thus amounts to a “collecting of oneself.” Ibid, p. 258. See also pp. 
188, 190, 193; and Fear and Trembling, p. 54. 
71 Either/Or: Part II, p. 65. See also ibid., pp. 36, 41, 44, 60, 72, 77, 89. On p. 62 we are told that “since marriage 
is an inner harmony in this way, it of course has its telos in itself.” See also p. 90.  
72 Ibid., p. 62. 
73 Ibid., p. 61. 
74 Ibid., pp. 254–56, 268. 
75 Ibid., p. 85. 
76 See ibid., p. 49. 
77 See ibid., p. 40. 
78 Ibid., p. 118. See also pp. 88–89, 109, 117–18, 258. 
79 Fear and Trembling, p. 68. 
12 
 
“dramaturgically” rather than technically, politically, structurally, or culturally.80 “Role-players,” 
that is, should be judged according to the standards of performers and, “qua performers, 
individuals are concerned not with the moral issue of realizing these standards but with the amoral 
issue of engineering a convincing impression that these standards are being realized.”81 So 
according to this view, rather than actually being virtuous, what matters is one’s ability to signal 
virtue. Or one’s failure to do so, as in the following startling example: 
 
when a surgeon and his nurse both turn from the operating table and the anesthetized 
patient accidentally rolls off the table to his death, not only is the operation disrupted 
in an embarrassing way, but the reputation of the doctor, as a doctor and as a man, and 
also the reputation of the hospital may be weakened.82  
 
This amoral, because aesthetic, approach is only to be expected whenever one begins with the 
assumption that such events transpire within a unity. Genuine ethics, by contrast, often requires 
responding to a conflict that, potentially, may not be resolvable; this is one reason for its 
seriousness. Of course, Kierkegaard recognizes that such conflicts will sooner or later arise, if only 
because ethical requirements are sometimes insatiable. But for him this marks not the essential 
condition of the ethical but its breakdown. It is because, ultimately, “the individual always goes 
bankrupt,”83 that the (so-called) ethicist’s “soul is dissipated in multiplicity.”84 
Which brings us to religion, the next sphere(s). Like the previous ones, Religiousness A is 
ostensibly self-contained, albeit in an infinite way reminiscent of an ouroboros: “Religiousness A 
is the dialectic of taking to heart; it is the relation to an eternal happiness that is not conditioned 
by a something, but is the dialectical taking to heart of the relation itself, conditioned alone, that 
is, by the taking to heart.”85 As noted, its highest form is that of Hegelian philosophy, which 
underlies the “Christendom” (in contrast to genuine Christianity) that Kierkegaard believes was 
                                               
80 See Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959), p. 240. 
81 Ibid., p. 251. 
82 Ibid., p. 243. 
83 Stages on Life’s Way, p. 476. See also Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 224. 
84 Fear and Trembling, p. 43. 
85 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 465. 
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incarnated by the Danish church of his day. But as this Christendom ultimately amounts to no 
more than “playing Christianity,”86 we have here yet again something that Kierkegaard should 
have identified as aesthetic. 
Regardless, Hegelian philosophy claims to be an absolute, and so unconditional, idealism – 
one which contains all reality. So we need to appreciate how it fails when confronted by events 
such as the Bible’s Binding of Isaac (Genesis 22). Hegel would have us view Abraham as a great 
man for, despite representing an extreme form of alienation from the world, he is the starting-point 
of a dialectic progression that culminates in the overcoming of all oppositions, including the one 
between the world and the God who transcends it.87 While Abraham’s role in this “teleology of 
the moral” is accepted by Kierkegaard, when it comes to religion, Kierkegaard objects that Hegel 
“is wrong in not protesting loudly and clearly against Abraham’s enjoying honor and glory as a 
father of faith when he should be sent back to a lower court and shown up as a murderer.”88 
Otherwise put: Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son for God means that he embodies an 
unresolvable paradox, which Hegel refuses to recognize. Emil L. Fackenheim has raised a similar 
objection as regards the aporia that is the Holocaust: philosophy cannot remain silent about it and 
do it justice, yet it cannot comprehend it either, since it is inherently incomprehensible.89 Notice, 
however, that such irreconcilables do not lead Kierkegaard to claim that Religiousness A breaks 
down, like the aesthetic and the ethical spheres, into a plurality; rather, his point appears to be 
merely that it fails to acknowledge the presence of plurality, and so the gaps between itself as a 
unified religion and the now-shattered antecedent spheres.90 To Kierkegaard, Hegelian religion’s 
                                               
86 Kierkegaard’s Attack upon “Christendom”: 1854–1855, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1968), pp. 8, 44, 121, 149, 179. 
87 See Hegel, “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” in Early Theological Writings, ed. Richard Kroner, trans. 
T.M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), pp. 182–89. 
88 Fear and Trembling, p. 55. For helpful commentary, see Mark C. Taylor, “Journeys to Moriah: Hegel vs. 
Kierkegaard,” Harvard Theological Review 70, nos. 3–4 (July-Oct. 1977): 305–26; as well as Jon Stewart, 
Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 7. 
89 “Indeed, such are the crises which have befallen the Christian West in the last half century that it may safely be 
said that, were he alive today, so realistic a philosopher as Hegel would not be a Hegelian.” Fackenheim, The Religious 
Dimension in Hegel’s Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 224; see also his To Mend the Word: 
Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 238. 
90 See Fear and Trembling, pp. 54–55. 
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monist denial of these gaps – of their very possibility, in fact – leaves it unable to fully account for 
reality. This is why it is merely theological and so, in a sense, faithless.91 
Religiousness B, by contrast, upholds a genuine, because pluramonist, faith. It is Christianity 
as a serious, mature religion, one that follows Abraham in having undergone a “rebirth”92 and 
weaned itself from the childlike belief in monism, in unity alone.93 Instead of this, it embraces 
paradox,94 affirming both the unified dialectic of Religiousness A alongside the plural remnants 
of the ethical and aesthetic – both the infinity of the former and the finitudes of the latter. If we 
truly want to live “a personally ethical and religious existence,”95 Kierkegaard therefore believes, 
we ought to uphold the unmediatable paradoxes that arise from such contradictory truths, not the 
least of which is the idea that Abraham must both love his son if he is to be a good father and be 
willing to sacrifice him if he is to follow God.96  
 
III. Suspending the Ethical?  
Kierkegaard has famously described the latter as entailing a “suspension” of the ethical.97 But why, 
especially given the act’s “horrifying”98 nature, does he not refer to religion “overriding” ethics 
instead? As Michael Walzer has pointed out, to override a prescription is to violate it while 
recognizing that it nevertheless still stands; whereas to suspend it is to set it aside, to cancel or 
annul it temporarily. This is why those who do the former are understood to dirty their hands, 
unlike those who do the latter.99 “Suspension” is nonetheless appropriate in Abraham’s case, given 
his certainty that God will ultimately halt the sacrifice. True, Abraham “infinitely renounces the 
                                               
91 See ibid., p. 48. 
92 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Crumbs, in Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, trans. M.G. Piety (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 96. Note that this “rebirth” (Gjenfødslen) is different from the idea of being “reborn” 
(Opvakt, better translated as “awakened”), which is a target of criticism on p. 381 of the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript. See M.G. Piety, “A Problem with Hannay’s Postscript,” in Piety on Kierkegaard, 16 April 2017, 
https://pietyonkierkegaard.com/tag/born-again/. 
93 See Fear and Trembling, pp. 9, 13. 
94 See e.g. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 152, 175, 179, 183. 
95 Ibid., p. 258; see also Fear and Trembling, pp. 38, 40. 
96 See Fear and Trembling, pp. 30, 33, 56–57, 59, 66. 
97 See ibid., p. 54. 
98 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 224. 
99 See Walzer, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” p. 286. 
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love that is the substance of his life,” but at the same time his boundless faith that he will not lose 
his son means that, ultimately, he will “not renounce anything.”100 Even if he were actually allowed 
to carry out the murder, he believes that “God could give him a new Isaac, could restore to life the 
one sacrificed.”101 This is the paradox in his case, and it is why he is able to be both at “peace and 
rest and comfort in the pain.”102 In the end, Abraham assumes that he won’t have to violate ethics 
after all, that his love of God will allow him to act for God’s sake as well as for his own and his 
neighbours.103 And he knows this by virtue of the absurd,104 his embrace of pluramonist paradox, 
not because of the monist, speculative form of reason underlying Hegelian dialectics (even though 
it, too, claims to suspend any paradox).105  
So we may consider Abraham’s preparations for the sacrifice as akin to, say, Jesus’ 
withholding the whole truth about his eventual fate when he knows that his followers are not yet 
ready to hear it.106 Because while Abraham’s suspension of the ethical indeed constitutes a 
“trial,”107 it is one whose verdict is a foregone conclusion. Or so he believes. 
But what about Isaac? What must he have thought? And what must the vast majority of us 
think, including presumably Kierkegaard himself? For unlike Abraham, we are not knights of faith 
– if we do believe, then we do so with a degree of doubt; sometimes, with quite a lot.108 That is 
why we cannot help but see Abraham as someone who would, at least potentially, have violated 
one of the most fundamental ethical imperatives. And it is why, even though God did indeed 
                                               
100 Fear and Trembling, pp. 48; see also p. 49. 
101 Ibid., p. 36. 
102 Ibid., p. 45. 
103 See ibid., pp. 59, 70–71. 
104 See ibid., pp. 46–49, 115. 
105 See Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 186–87, 190. 
106 See Stages on Life’s Way, p. 230; and John 16:4, 12. 
107 See Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 221. 
108 Miguel de Unamuno goes even further: “Those who believe that they believe in God, but without any passion 
in their heart, without anguish of mind, without uncertainty, without doubt, without an element of despair even in their 
consolation, believe only in the God-Idea, not in God Himself.” Tragic Sense of Life, trans. J.E. Crawford Flitch (New 
York: Dover, 1921), p. 193. In The Agony of Christianity, trans. Kurt F. Reinhardt (New York: F. Ungar Publishing 
Co., 1960), p. 19, Unamuno writes: “A faith which knows no doubt is a dead faith.” 
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ultimately revoke His sacrificial order, we recognize that serious moral damage was done; hands 
were dirtied.109 
So Kierkegaard should have mentioned that, to most, Abraham indeed overrode, rather than 
merely suspended, the ethical. Kierkegaard’s failure to do so suggests that we have here an 
example of when his pluramonism has degraded to monism, and so aestheticism. I want to 
conclude by identifying two others.  
First, there is his Christian anti-Pelagianism: Kierkegaard seems to believe that only Jesus 
Christ allows access to the paradox that is true religion, and so is the only way of truly overcoming 
sin. For example, he considers (Rabbinic) Jewish law (halakha) “merely a point of transition,” the 
implication being that Judaism’s ostensible supersession by Christianity was something that can 
be considered thoroughly clean.110 But anyone who takes the history seriously will know that the 
reality was, of course, quite the opposite.111 The excuse has been offered that Kierkegaard was, 
after all, “a man of his times.”112 But he was also a genius, in many ways ahead of his time. So 
why not in this one?113  
Second, I mentioned above how show or performance is a major aesthetic mode that 
Kierkegaard tends to overlook. I think his own writing exemplifies this. Emmanuel Levinas has 
described it as “shamelessly exhibitionist,”114 and indeed it is hard not to wonder at not merely its 
excessive didacticism and repetition, but also its flashiness. A large amount of the rhetorical 
                                               
109 As I have pointed out in “What’s Wrong with Hypergoods,” in Patriotic Elaborations: Essays in Practical 
Philosophy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), p. 132. 
110 Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers: Volume 2, F-K, eds. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), no. 2208; see also The Concept of Irony in The Concept of Irony: With 
Continual Reference to Socrates and Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, eds. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. 
Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 262–63. On halakha as a genuine form of paradoxical, 
revelatory creativity, see my “On the Minimal Global Ethic,” in Patriotic Elaborations, pp. 168–72. 
111 See, for example, James Carroll, Constantine’s Sword: The Church and the Jews, A History (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 2001); and David Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2013), chs. 2–3, 6–7, 9. 
112 Aaron Fehir, Kierkegaardian Reflections on the Problem of Pluralism (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2015), 
p. 75. 
113 A point made by Peter Tudvad in the first part of the preface to his Stadier paa Antisemitisms Vej: Søren 
Kierkegaard og Jøderne (Stages on the Way of Antisemitism: Søren Kierkegaard and the Jews) (Copenhagen: 
Rosinante & Co., 2010); see the translation by M.G. Piety in Piety on Kierkegaard, 26 December 2011, 
https://pietyonkierkegaard.com/category/kierkegaard-and-the-jews/. 
114 Levinas, “Existence and Ethics,” trans. Jonathan Rée, in Rée and Jane Chamberlain, eds., Kierkegaard: A 
Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1988), p. 34. 
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superfluity in Kierkegaard’s writings seems to have no other end than display. If pressed, I think 
he would concede the point, admitting (again) that he is no knight of faith. For as he himself tells 
us, a true knight would be silent about his faith, since he would have “no vain desire to instruct 
others”; indeed, he would also appear as a typical member of society, of whom “no one ever 
suspects anything else.”115 So it should be hard to tell knight from ethicist. By his own lights, then, 
a strictly religious Kierkegaard should have appeared as much like Fritz Schlegel, that thoroughly 
marriageable man who ended up wedding Regine Olsen, the woman Kierkegaard loved but 
ultimately spurned.116 He himself never married, of course; instead, he chose to live the life of a 
literary celebrity bachelor, someone often mocked as a flamboyant dandy who, nevertheless, 
would parade about town in ill-fitting clothes.117 
It is useful here to contrast Kierkegaard’s self-exposure with Augustine’s. The latter’s 
confessions are certainly entertaining, but they also reveal his candour. There is a thoroughly 
serious purpose behind Augustine’s recounting of lurid deeds. God, of course, already knows all. 
But through Augustine’s confessions, other young men will be able to recognize how low they 
have gone and so how high they must go. By contrasting the depths of sin with the height of God, 
Augustine thereby performs an important rhetorical function: the worse the former appear, the 
better the latter. “As for the good, it rejoices them to hear of sins committed in the past by men 
now free from them: not because these things are sins, but because they were and no longer are.”118 
In short, Augustine’s end is the thoroughly serious one of encouraging conversion.  
I would say that this is also true of much – though not all – of Kierkegaard’s writings. By 
demonstrating to aesthetes, ethicists, and pagans that he knows them better than they know 
themselves, Kierkegaard effectively communicates the message that they would do better to adopt 
his version of Christianity. Sometimes, however, he would too. 
 
 
                                               
115 Fear and Trembling, pp. 80, 41; and see pp. 113, 115 on Abraham’s silence. 
116 Schlegel has been described as “practically the exact opposite of Kierkegaard: stable, harmonious, healthy, un-
ironic, and patient; he was thus made for marriage.” Joakim Garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, trans. Bruce H. 
Kirmmse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 485. 
117 See Kierkegaard, The Corsair Affair: And Articles Related to the Writings, eds. and trans. Howard V. and Edna 
H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
118 Augustine, Confessions, ed. Michael P. Foley, trans. F.J. Sheed (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 
2006, 2nd ed.), bk. 10, ch. 3 (p. 212). 
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IV. Just War and the Supreme Emergency 
Faced with a supreme emergency, in which “our deepest values and our collective survival are in 
imminent danger,”119 Walzer has argued that we may violate the rules of war and thereby fight 
unjustly, say by bombing civilians. In allowing for multiple exceptions to the (supposedly) unified 
theory of just war, Walzer can be interpreted as combining pluralism and monism in the very same 
paradoxical way as Kierkegaard, albeit in secular terms rather than as a means of achieving 
openness to revelation.120 Regardless, the decision-making involved should be characterized as 
based on a form of creativity that goes beyond reason; it’s not for nothing that Walzer has had very 
little to say about how, exactly, we are to determine what we may do. The theory of just war itself 
certainly cannot coherently tell us when it should be overridden, despite the monist claims of some 
political philosophers.121 In fact, as Jeremy Waldron has written:  
 
There is a sense in Walzer’s discussion that in certain circumstances, the bottom drops 
out of our ability to argue our way legally or morally through a problem, because the 
assumptions that normally underpin such arguments have been shaken or have 
otherwise evaporated…When the circumstances of justice fail in this way, the result is 
not a neat alternative set of moral prescriptions, but rather some radical uncertainty 
about whether we can think normatively at all.122 
 
So we are, it seems, supposed to rely on something like “inspiration” – a term that not only has 
connotations of irrationality and mystery but, especially when it comes to actions during wartime, 
should make us particularly attentive to the grave dangers involved. Be that as it may, it is 
                                               
119 Michael Walzer, “Emergency Ethics,” in Arguing About War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 
33; see also Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 
ch. 16. 
120 For more on Walzer’s pluramonism, see my “Dirty Hands: The One and the Many,” The Monist 101, no. 2 
(Apr. 2018): 150–69, pp. 159–61. 
121 See, for example, Richard J. Arneson, “Just Warfare Theory and Noncombatant Immunity,” Cornell 
International Law Journal 39, no. 3 (2006): 663–88; Nathan R. Colaner, “How Just War Theory May Survive Without 
the Supreme Emergency Exemption,” Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2009); and 
William R. Lund, “Reconsidering ‘Supreme Emergencies’: Michael Walzer and his Critics,” Social Theory and 
Practice 37, no. 4 (2011): 654–78. For a good summary of the issue, see Daniel Statman, “Supreme Emergencies and 
the Continuum Problem,” Journal of Military Ethics 11, no. 4 (2012): 287–98. 
122 Jeremy Waldron, “Reflections on ‘Supreme Emergency’,” NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper 
no. 17–45, 14 November 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3064952, pp. 14–15. 
19 
 
necessary to decide, since to do nothing is still to do something (even if this is best described as 
suicidal). Otherwise, we shirk our responsibilities to face up to a genuine ethical dilemma. 
Thankfully, Walzer – and Kierkegaard before him – have helped us to identify one approach we 
might take. 
